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One common avenue for public participation in regulatory decisions
is the public advisory committee. In some cases, advisory committees
expose regulatory agencies to a wider range of scientific and policy
viewpoints than they might otherwise obtain. In other cases, advisory
committees can prejudice the decision making process by issuing biased
or uneducated advice. Recognizing this potential, Congress has
established procedures designed to make advisory committee
deliberations more accountable to the public. These procedures,
however, may be insufficient to establish accountability for advisory
committees that assist agencies in the regulation of hazardous chemicals.
Advisory Committees and Public Accountability
Some important regulatory issues are resolved by Congress, but
more often the questions are delegated to health and safety agencies. 1
Advisory committees have a role to play in holding agency
administrators accountable for the way in which they resolve these
questions. When the product of a committee's deliberations is placed in
the administrative record, it is available to those who engage in political
* Professor Shapiro has his J.D. from the University of Pennsylvania and is the
Rounds Professor of Law, University of Kansas.
1 Aronson, Gellhorn, and Robinson, A Theory of Legislation Delegation, 68
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 21-24, 43-45 (1982); Pierce and Shapiro, Political and
Judicial Review of Agency Action, 59 TEx. L. REV. 1175, 1197-98 (1981).
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and judicial oversight of the agency. If an administrator takes actions
inconsistent with a committee's recommendations, and the administrator
fails to explain adequately the departure, overseers are more likely to
modify or reverse the decision. For example, if an administrator relies
on scientific data which a committee found to be unreliable, those who
review the administrator's decision are more likely to scrutinize the
decision more closely. In this manner, the committee's input constrains
the administrator's discretion.
Advisory committees, however, also have the potential to make the
administrative process less accountable. There is a potential that
government power will be delegated to private parties, that committees
will issue biased or uneducated advice, or that administrators will
inappropriately use committees to bolster preconceived policy
preferences.
If an administrator merely accepts the advice of an advisory
committee, without independent evaluation of the merits of the advice,
the official will have delegated a regulatory decision to private parties.
The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does not permit the
delegation of public policy matters to private parties because they are
entirely outside the system of checks and balances that serve to constrain
the exercise of discretion by government officials.2
Committee advice can be biased if a committee is only composed of
persons with similar backgrounds and experiences. For example,
individuals employed by industry tend over time to adopt a point of
view consistent with their employer's interests. Even if the effect is so
subtle that it is unnoticed by an individual, it still can influence the type
of advice the person will give.3 Similarly, persons employed in the
2 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); see generally, Jaffe, Law
Making By Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201 (1937).
3 T. GREENWOOD, KNOWLEDGE AND DiscRmON IN GOvERNMENT REGULATION 194
(1984).
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same scientific subspecialities develop similar biases. Disciplinary bias
can greatly affect the determination of such issues as carcinogenicity
because persons in different fields will weigh different types of
scientific evidence differently. 4 In some cases, an agency
administrator may not realize that the advice he or she is being given is
different than that a more balanced committee might present. 5
Scientific or technical advisory committees also have the potential
for issuing uneducated advice by departing the confines of science,
where technical expertise is critical, and wandering into the realm of
policy, where technical expertise has no particular virtue. A good
example is the level of certainty demanded before drawing a conclusion
that a possible cause is associated with a particular effect. Scientists are
generally unwilling to draw cause-effect conclusions from statistical data
absent a high degree of confidence that the observed association did not
occur by chance. For purposes of publishing scientific papers and
establishing scientific reputations, this degree of conservatism is entirely
appropriate. But an administrator may decide not to demand such a high
degree of confidence when the lives of hundreds of people are at stake.
Instead, the policy maker may decide to err on the side of safety.
Another administrator implementing a less protective policy might
require a greater degree of confidence. Whatever degree of confidence is
4 Ashford, Advisory Committees in OSHA and EPA: Their Use in Regulatory
Decisionmaking, 9 ScL, TEcH. & HUM. VALUES 72, 77-78 (1984). Another example
of the professional bias is that of practicing health professionals, such as the largely
academic, but clinically oriented physicians, who have dominated the advisory
committees of FDA's Bureau of Drugs. Because these individuals tend to be activist
in their pursuit of improved human health, advisory committees at FDA often
express a greater willingness than the FDA's staff to permit marketing of a drug that
would be efficacious, but which would also involve some risk. T. GREENWOOD,
supra note 3, at 194.
5 See R. WEGMEN, THE U'UIZTION AND MANAGEMENT OF FEDERAL ADVISORY
COMMrrmES 41-45 (1983). A similar problem is created when members of a
committee have a financial interest in the outcome of the matter for which they are
giving advice.
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chosen, however, is question of policy, not of science.6
Members of scientific or technical advisory committees often do not
admit, and may not even recognize, when they exceed their expertise
and based recommendations on policy values. This result not only
obscures the distinction between science and policy decisions, but it can
also impede the agency's decision making process. Even if the agency
recognizes what the committee has done, it must attempt to explain why
it wishes to reject the committee's recommendation. If the committee is
composed of distinguished scientists, the agency may find it politically
difficult to explain itself.7
Finally, as long as the policy aspect of a science/policy question is
not immediately apparent to the public, a decision maker can use an
advisory committee to shield himself or herself from criticism for policy
choices by maintaining that the decision was made in accordance with
the neutral advice of an independent scientific advisory committee. 8
This strategy can be implemented by "stacking" the committee with
scientists whose past actions indicate that they will generally resolve
science/policy questions in accordance with the administrator's policy
preferences or by hiding from the committee data which is not favorable
to the result supported by the administrators. 9
6 Shapiro, Scientific Issues and the Function of Hearing Procedures: Evaluating
the FDA's Public Board of Inquiry, 1986 DUKE L.J. 288, 293-94; McGarity,
Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science-
Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729,
731-49 (1979).
7 T. GREENWOOD, supra note 3, at 230-31.
8 T. GREENWOOD. supra note 3, at 226-29; Ashford, supra note 4, at 51-52.
9 See, e.g., Green, The Odyssey of Depro-Provera: Contraceptives, Carcin-
ogenic Drugs, and Risk-Management, 42 FOOD D. Cos. L.J. 567, 571-78 (1987)
(FDA administrators did not disclose information unfavorable to the approval of
Depro-Provera to an advisory committee reviewing the drug.); Address by T.
McGarity, Risk and Trust: The Role of Regulatory Agencies in Dealing With Risk:
The Courts, the Agencies, and Congress 16 (1985) (Presentation delivered at
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Federal Advisory Committee Act
In the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), Congress took
several steps to promote the public accountability of advisory
committees. Two of the most important requirements establish
qualifications for membership on an advisory committee and create a
"paper trail" of documents to explain a committee's decision. When
Congress or an agency creates an advisory committee, its membership
must be "fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented and
the functions to be performed by the advisory committee" and
appropriate precautions must be taken to ensure that committees are not
influenced by "any special interest."10 This requirement addresses the
problem that a committee might give biased advice because it does not
have members of opposing viewpoints or because its members have a
conflict of interest. In addition, FACA requires agencies to give prior
notice of meetings, to hold open meetings in most cases, to keep
"detailed minutes of each meeting, and to give the public access to most
committee records, transcripts, minutes and other documents."11 This
"paper trail" should enable interested persons, including those who
oversee the agency, to evaluate the adequacy of an administrator's
decision in light of the information produced by an advisory
committee. 12
Fourteenth Annual Conference on the Environment - on file with author). "Hit
lists" were circulated during the transition of administrations at EPA in 1981 (which
suggested that certain members of a scientific advisory committee be purged); see
generally Ashford, supra note 4, at 51. [Governments have sometimes used
advisory committees for little more than implementing a decision made before the
committee was established by appointing either (1) members who will merely
"rubber stamp" government decisions, or (2) influential community leaders whose
support is needed for implementation of a government decision.]
10 5 U.S.C. Appendix § 5(b)(2)-(3) (1982).
11 Id. at§ 10.
12 See S. Rep. No. 1098, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1972). (Before FACA, "[t]he
lack of public scrutiny of the activities of advisory committees was found to pose the
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The Requirement of Fair Balance
The requirement that the membership of a committee be "fairly
balanced" has been implemented by Congress and agencies in three
ways. Some committees are balanced by specifying that members
represent specific affiliations such as interest groups. Other committees
are balanced by requiring that members have diverse educational and
professional backgrounds. Finally, other committees are subject only to
the general requirement that their membership be "balanced" without any
further enumeration of what constitutes an adequate balance.
Attempts to balance committees by mandating participation by
interest groups has produced an unworkable advisory committee system
at the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). OSHA is
authorized to appoint ad hoe advisory committees in developing specific
workplace regulations. Membership must be balanced to assure
representation of the views of employers, workers, and state health and
safety organizations. 13 Although OSHA appointed advisory
committees for some of its initial regulations, it stopped using the
committees in 1976 because committee meetings produced partisan
disagreements between persons representing labor and management. 14
Although Congress intended that OSHA obtain scientific and
engineering advice from advisory committees, by mandating that
committees be formed on the basis of affiliation rather than scientific
expertise, Congress prevented OSHA from appointing to its advisory
committees leading technical and scientific experts. 15
danger that subjective influences not in the public interest could be exerted on the
Federal decisionmakers.").
13 29 U.S.C. § 656(a)(2) (1982).
14 Shapiro and McGarity, Rethinking OSHA: Rulemaking Reforms and Legis-
lative Changes, 6 YALE J. REG. 1, 35 (1989). Merrill, Federal Regulation of
Cancer-Causing Chemicals, in ADMINSTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 148 (1982).
15 T. GREENWOOD, supra note 3, at 130.
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Other agencies, where membership requirements are based on
training and experience, have avoided the type of polarization that has
plagued OSHA. 16 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has a
large, formalized advisory committee system to obtain advice
concerning both drugs and human devices. 17 Members of committees,
who are selected by FDA, and who are screened for conflicts of interest
must have "expertise in the subject matter with which the committee is
concerned and have diverse education, training, arid experience so that
the committee will reflect composition of sufficient scientific expertise to
handle the problems that come before it.... ,18
The comparison of OSHA and FDA suggests that attempts to
balance membership on an interest group basis may be misguided.
Based on OSHA's experience, the Administrative Conference of the
United States (ACUS) recommends that members of technical or peer
review advisory committees should be selected "primarily for their
expertise in relevant scientific fields" rather than for their institutional or
group affiliation. 19 ACUS believes that Congress should replace the
detailed restrictions it has created for OSHA's advisory committees with
a general provision authorizing use of advisory committees subject only
to the FACA requirement of balanced membership.20
The minimum requirement that a committee be "balanced," however,
may permit exclusion of consumer or environmental representatives
16 Shapiro and McGarity, supra note 14, at 48-51.
17 The Center for Drugs and Biologics at FDA has eighteen permanent advisory
committees, and the Center for Devices and Radiological Health has nineteen such
committees. See 21 C.F.R. § 14.100 (1987). (list of FDA's standing advisory
committees); see generally Brown & Richard, Advisory Committees and the Drug
Process, 2 J. CLIN. RSCH. 15, 16-17 (1988). (description of FDA advisory
committee system).
18 21 C.F.R. at § 14.80(b)(1)(i) (1989).
19 Recommendation 82-5, 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-5 (1988).
20 Recommendation 87-10, 1 C.F.R. § 305.87-10 (1988).
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from scientific or technical advisory committees. In National Anti-
Hunger Coalition v. Executive Committee of the President's Private
Sector Survey On Cost Control, the recipients of federal food assistant
benefits challenged the makeup of an advisory committee appointed by
the President to obtain management and cost control advice.2 1 All but
three of the committee's one hundred and fifty members were executives
of major corporations. The court noted that FACA requires balance only
as to the "functions to be performed by the advisory committee," which
in this case was to give advice concerning management and cost
controls, and that the plaintiffs had no expertise in that area. The court
concluded that "[s]urely Congress did not intend to prohibit the
President from seeking specialized advice and while one may speculate
that different choices might have been made to accomplish the
President's objective the simple gathering of a discrete group of experts
in a particular narrow field is not in itself enough to render such an
advisory committee unbalanced in the sense of FACA".22
In a later proceeding, the court found a violation of FACA because
three of the committee's conclusions recommended repeal of existing
legislation concerning specific benefits granted to poor persons such as
the plaintiffs.23 The court drew a distinction between these recom-
mendations, which were "substantive in nature because they affect[ed]
established statutory rights" and the rest of the committee's
recommendations, which fell into the "narrow area of cost and
management control." 24 As to the substantive issues, the court held the
committee was not balanced because it -did not contain any
21 557 F.Supp. 524 (D.D.C. 1983), affd. 711 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1983),
modflied in part 566 F. Supp. 1515 (D.D.C. 1983).
22 557 F.Supp., at 528 (D.D.C. 1983).
23 National Hunger Coalition v. Executive Committee of the President's Private
Sector Survey on Cost Control, 566 F. Supp. 1515 (D.D.C. 1983).
24 Id. at 1516.
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representatives of persons who would be affected if the statutes were
repealed.
The result in National Anti-Hunger Coalition suggests that a
technical or peer review advisory committee could be restricted to
persons with scientific backgrounds as long as the committee was
restricted to issues that required scientific training and experience to
evaluate.2 5 Persons who serve on peer review and technical advisory
committees support this outcome. They believe that balance should be
sought only among persons of expert or technical backgrounds. 26 One
argument for exclusion of nonexperts is that they would be able to offer
little or no assistance concerning the resolution of technical matters.
Moreover, OSHA's experience indicates that the scientific orientation of
advisory committees can be disrupted if persons are appointed to
represent interest groups.
Arguments also exist, however, for the including of nonexperts. As
indicated earlier, it is difficult to separate scientific and policy issues
and, for that reason, advisory committees often consider both issues.
National Anti-Hunger Coalition recognized that when "substantive" or
policy issues are considered, a committee is not balanced if those
affected by a proposed policy decision have no representation.
Moreover, the presence of nonexperts is some protection against the
advisory committee operating in a manner that decreases public
accountability. Finally, the legislative and administrative history of
FACA indicates that the requirement of "balance" was intended to
25 R.WE;MAN,supra note 5, at 191.
26 Id. at 196 (1983 survey of several agencies). See also, Brown and Richard,
supra note 17, at 21 (survey of persons who serve on FDA new drug advisory
committees). In the survey, only nine of the respondents strongly favored inclusion
of consumers and industry representatives while 51% strongly disagreed that these
persons would assist the process. Id. at 21. But see, e.g., Lakshmanan, An
Empirical Argument for Nontechnical Public Members on Advisory Committees:
FDA as a Model, 1 RISK 61, 67 (1990) (discussing two further surveys of members
of FDA advisory committees).
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require the inclusion of interested and knowledgeable nonexperts on
advisory committees.27
FDA has placed consumer and industry members on advisory
committees it consults concerning over-the-counter drugs, medical
devices, and biologics and, while these committees have their share of
problems, participants believe they have generally functioned well.2 8
According to FDA's rules, consumer and industry members need not
have technical expertise, and, because they represent specific interests,
they are not subject to the conflict of interest requirements applied to
voting members, but because of such conflicts, they are not allowed to
vote. 29
The inclusion of nonexperts as nonvoting members is a reasonable
compromise concerning the issue of whether consumers or
environmentalists should be placed on technical and peer review
advisory committees. Nonvoting members would be able to participate
in committee deliberations, or at least monitor them, without being able
to influence the committee's outcome, except by the persuasion of their
advocacy. For that reason, an advisory committee with consumers as
nonvoting members should retain its scientific orientation and not
27 Ashford, supra note 4 at 51.
28 Friedman, Representation in Regulatory Decision Making: Scientific,
Industrial, and Consumer Inputs to the F.DA., 38 PUB. AD. REv. 205, 210 (1978);
Field, GMPAC: A Perspective, MED. DEviCEs & DiAG. IND. 8 (1986); see also
Brown & Richard, supra note 17, at 25. (FDA use of consumers and industry
representatives has been "successful").
29 21 C.F.R. at §§ 14.80(b)(1), 14.80(b)(2)(i), 14.80(e), 14.84 (requirements for
nonvoting members) (1990). Most of the FDA committees consist of nine members,
seven of whom are professionals in the field of the committee's subject matter; one
member represents industry and one represents consumers. Scientific members are
selected on the basis of nominations submitted by interested professional grounds and
individuals. Industry and consumer representatives are appointed on the basis of
nominations from industry and consumer organizations. Friedman, supra note 28, at
206.
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become adversarial.
Paper Trail
If the issue of whether to include nonexperts on advisory
committees is resolved against including consumer or environmental
representatives, the requirement of a "paper trail" takes on greater
importance. In these cases, consumer or environmental representatives
must depend on the FACA requirement of a paper trail to determine how
a committee reached its decision and whether committee
recommendations were justified. In this manner, the paper trail serves as
a "backup" or substitute protection for the requirement of a "balanced"
committee.
The FACA requirements concerning the paper trail, however, may
not be sufficiently specific to generate the information necessary to track
the committee's deliberations. FACA requires that "detailed minutes of
each meeting shall be kept and shall contain a record of the persons
present, a complete and accurate description of matters discussed and
conclusions reached, and copies of all reports received, issued, or
approved by the advisory committee". 30 At the FDA, however, the
minutes sometimes only briefly summarize the disposition of a matter,
they fail to identify clearly either the questions that the FDA posed to the
committee or the specific answers the committee formulated and the
basis for those answers.31
An agency (or Congress if it amended FACA) could improve the
paper trail if it required advisory committees to indicate what issues the
committee is to resolve, what are ways in which each issue could be
resolved, which resolution the committee recommends, and why that
resolution was chosen. A further improvement would address how the
agency responds to the committee's recommendations. The
30 5 U.S.C. Appendix at § 10 (c) (1982).
31 Shapiro, supra note 6, at 331.
I RISK -Issues in Health & Safety 189 [Summer 1990]
Administrative Conference recommends that when an agency rejects an
advisory panel's scientific judgment, it "should explain the basis for that
rejection" and "[w]hen an agency selects a regulatory approach whose
basis appears inconsistent with a panel's advice, it should explain the
legal, social, and other reasons that dictate or justify that choice."32
Restrictions On A Committee's Agenda
Requiring more specific minutes should make the use of advisory
committees more accountable. As an additional protection, an agency
could distinguish between scientific and policy issues and restrict
scientific advisory committees to the resolution of scientific matters. 33
At the current time, the questions submitted to an advisory committee
can range from the scientific - "Did a study have a sound
methodology?" - to the policy-dominated - "Considering the
scientific data, is this chemical safe? ' 34 As discussed earlier, the
submission of policy issues to a scientific advisory committee may
introduce into the panel's deliberations legal or policy issues that lie
beyond its competence.
There are some disadvantages, however, to restricting the agenda of
a technical or peer review advisory committee. First, it is sometimes
difficult to separate the policy and scientific issues. The same issue can
have both a scientific and policy aspect and the agency might want the
committee to address the scientific side of the matter. 35 For example,
32 Recommendation 82-5, supra note 19.
33 Cf. Brannigan, The First FDA Public Board of Inquiry: The Aspartame Case
in LAW AND SCIENCEIN COLLABORATION 201 (M. Carrow & J. Nyhart eds. 1983)
(FDA should submit only "scientific" questions to FDA's Public Board of Inquiry,
special type of scientific advisory committee.); see also Note, The FDA's Public
Board of Inquiry and the Aspartame Decision, 58 IND. LU. 627, 639 (1983), to the
same effect.
34 Merrill, supra note 14, at 130.
35 See McGarity, supra note 6, at 747-48. ("Scientists may decide a policy
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an agency typically asks a committee whether a cause-effect conclusion
can be made from the available statistical data. As explained earlier, the
agency should not be bound by the committee's advice, because an
administrator might accept a lower degree of confidence when lives are
at stake. Nevertheless, it would assist the administrator in making his or
her decision to know whether the scientists, applying a possibly higher
degree of confidence, found a cause-effect relationship. Second,
attempts to restrict the committee's agenda might invite charges that the
agency has tampered with the committee's independence. 36 Third,
although scientists do not necessarily have expertise in policy matters,
individual scientists - based on their experiences with other regulatory
matters - might have significant insights to offer. Finally, policy
judgments require an appreciation of the nature of scientific judgments
and their relationship to regulation. Scientists can help an agency
understand that relationship. 37
In light of the previous disadvantages, an absolute ban on the
submission of policy issues to advisory committees might not be
beneficial in all cases. Moreover, even if an agency submits only
scientific questions to a committee, it will not always be possible to
confine the panel to the agency's statement of the issues to be decided.
Committee members may regard the agency's statement as incorrect, or
they may not be content to confine their advice to the "purely" scientific
questions that they were appointed to answer.3 8 Instead, a three step
approach is warranted. First, agencies should generally refrain from
referring policy questions to scientific advisory committees. Second, if
policy issues are submitted to a committee, they should be clearly
question one way for purposes of scientific analysis, while regulators may resolve it
in an entirely different fashion for purposes of implementing their statutory
mandates.")
36 Merrill, supra note 14, at 130.
37 Shapiro, supra note 6, at 321-22; Ashford, supra note 4, at 51.
38 Merrill, supra note 14, at 130.
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labeled as such, and they should be distinct from any scientific
questions which are submitted. Third, the agency should insist that a
clear paper trail be established concerning how the scientific and policy
questions were resolved. This last step could be implemented by
adopting the previous recommendation that committees be required to
indicate what issues the committee is to resolve, what are ways in which
each issue could be resolved, which resolution the committee
recommends, and why that resolution was chosen,
Conclusions
The public accountability of advisory committees depends on the
resolution of three issues. First, what constitutes a proper "balance" in
the membership of such committees? Nonexperts are typically excluded
from the membership of scientific and technical committees; balance is
produced by appointing scientists of different backgrounds and
experiences. Accountability would be better served, however, by
inclusion of nonexperts, at least in a nonvoting capacity. Second, what
constitutes an adequate paper trail to indicate how the committee made
its decision and on what basis? Current requirements mandating that
committees keep minutes are too general. Committees should be
required to indicate what issues the committee was to have resolved, an
explanation of each potential resolution of an issue, which resolution the
committee recommended, and why that resolution was chosen. Finally,
should agencies refer policy issues to advisory committees composed
solely of scientists? Because there are some benefits to obtaining policy
from scientists, submission of policy issues to such committees is
appropriate if rigorous safeguards are employed.
